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Abstract 
The challenges to building firm competitiveness in post-transition economies are 
many, particularly as global trade integration intensifies. Intra-nation variations in 
firm competitiveness are also stark, highlighting the need for policies to overcome 
the legacy of pre-transition economic structures. Utilising data from Georgia’s 
annual firm census and household surveys, this paper analyses the nature of the 
country’s firm competitiveness – measured as labour productivity – over the period 
2006-2012. The results of our empirical estimations reveal that although a large 
proportion of a firm’s competitiveness is associated with its own characteristics 
(sorting and compositional effects), location-specific factors are also highly relevant. 
In particular, the extent of agglomeration, human capital endowments, and local 
expenditures (such as transport infrastructure investments), play a significant role in 
conditioning firm-level competitiveness. Given current endowments across regions, 
these findings highlight the attention that needs to be paid to building capacities in 
less-favoured areas, not only to ensure that trade integration does not further harm 
Georgia’s less favoured regions, but also to make further progress in developing the 
country’s private sector and fully maximise the export potential across its stock of 
enterprises. 
Key words: Competitiveness; Productivity; Firms; Georgia; Transition economies  
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Introduction 
Firms in post-socialist transition economies have experienced considerable 
challenges to developing their private sectors, building competitiveness and finding 
vital sources of long-term economic growth. Following the onset of democracy and 
the shift from centrally planned to market economies, upheavals to business 
environments have been massive, with wide-ranging implications. While, on the one 
hand, the coupling of globalisation and trade liberalisation offers unprecedented 
opportunities for newly established post-transition firms to broaden their base of 
trade, enter new markets and raise their competitiveness, open market conditions, 
on the other hand, also heighten the risk that firms – and by extension the regions 
where they are located – struggle to compete. Hence, poorer and often less dynamic 
firms and regions could be left to lag behind. If one of the possible outcomes of 
greater openness is to create pervasive and lasting inter-regional disparities the 
perceived benefits of trade integration may ultimately be undermined. Worse still, 
vicious cycles of decline may take hold, become embedded, and destabilize the 
economy as a whole. 
There are two types of risk that prompt our close consideration of the ongoing 
processes of trade liberalisation in socialist transition countries: both loom large in 
Georgia. First, and our principal focus, is the potential impact of global integration on 
regional development and disparities in terms of the competitive performance of 
Georgian firms. Notwithstanding its small size, Georgia suffers from large and 
persistent regional disparities – a present and enduring source of political tension. 
Left unchecked, or if aggravated, greater levels of integration risks further 
marginalising peripheral, lagging regions. The result may be greater economic, social, 
and political instability (Williamson 2005; Brülhart 2011; Rodríguez-Pose 2012). 
More specifically, the potential exacerbation of disparities through efficiency losses, 
agency problems, and increased territorial competition (Prud'homme 1995; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2005) are real concerns, with the literature expounding 
these issues as particularly relevant to low- and middle-income countries like 
Georgia (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010).  
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Second, is the tendency to generate large trade deficits, which in the case of Georgia 
have averaged in excess of US$400 million per month in recent years. Having 
become an economy highly open to trade – its trade-GDP ratio has fluctuated 
between 60-70% over the last decade – it remains a concern that this deficit is driven 
by an increasingly concentrated export product mix, and non-tradeables in particular 
(Kuriakose, 2013). If this gap is to be closed, Georgia’s firms will need to raise their 
productivity, become more internationally competitive, and export. This is an issue 
of special pertinence in light of the Georgia’s future plans for decentralisation and 
export-led growth. More generally, with the country already lagging behind its 
regional peers (and, especially, Armenia) in a number of firm performance metrics – 
such as R&D output, innovation and entrepreneurship (Kuriakose, 2013) – these risks 
need to not only be better understood, but, in light of our analysis, real measures 
have to be implemented to overcome the barriers to Georgian firm competitiveness. 
This research takes a step in this direction and seeks to analyse how local conditions, 
amongst a myriad non-local factors, affect firm competitiveness in different parts of 
Georgia. Such analyses need to consider how the connections between a firm’s 
performance (measured as labour productivity), relate not only to a range of region-
specific factors, but also the nature of the industry and each firm’s innate 
specificities. In this paper, we therefore evaluate the extent to which the 
competitiveness of Georgian firms is conditioned by their location (i.e. place-based 
effects), controlling for the specific characteristics of each firm (i.e. sorting and 
compositional effects) and industry. The article begins by describing the state of 
regional disparities in Georgia, the relevant theoretical literature, and our empirical 
strategy, before focusing on the results of the analysis. 
 
Georgia, the transition, and regional disparities 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of fledgling transition states 
embarked upon a process of democratisation, institution building, and market-led 
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economic development. For many of these states moves to liberalise, privatise, and 
stabilise occurred rapidly, while in others, such as China, this process was more 
gradual (Qian 2002). For those in the former category, including Georgia, 
considerable literature points to the risks associated with dismantling established 
institutions rapidly before new ones are sufficiently embedded. Such a process can 
result not only in poor structural adjustment over longer time horizons (Murrell, 
2005), but can naturally lead to poorer firm performance over both the short- and 
long-term. 
For these rapid transition states, the immediate aftermath of independence brought 
a number of their economies to the brink of collapse (for a review of the first decade 
after transition see Campos and Coricelli 2002).  Georgia was no exception. GDP per 
capita fell to 27% of its pre transition level almost immediately. As Figure 1 shows, 
Georgia’s performance was also one of the weakest in the region, faring worse than 
not only the Caucasus average, but also below that of the averages of fellow 
transition states in Central Asia, the Baltics, Russia, and Eastern Europe. A prolonged 
period of political and economic stagnation ensued for much of the 1990s and early 
2000s, as moves towards economic stabilisation were interspersed with piecemeal 
structural reforms and growing tensions. This ultimately culminated in the ‘Rose 
Revolution’ of late 2003. However, following fresh elections and the implementation 
of a package of far-reaching and broad-based reforms in 2004, Georgia established 
some of the strong foundations needed for economic growth-led regional 
development. The economy has since recorded impressive GDP growth rates, 
peaking at over 12% in 2007, before falling considerably due to the domestic, 
international and conflict-based crises of 2008 – including mass-demonstrations, the 
global financial crisis, and the military conflict with Russia. The Georgian economy 
recovered from this period relatively quickly, growing 6% in 2012. Although still to 
return to pre-transition levels of GDP, the progress made has been considerable. 
This economic turnaround has not gone unnoticed. Significantly, in 2010, Georgia’s 
reputation as an easy place to do business was recognised by the World Bank (2010).  
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The country was featured as a leading reformer in the Ease of Doing Business index.1  
Among other things, this has been a boon to economic output, foreign investment, 
and new business activities in the country. 
Figure 1 here 
Throughout this boom phase Georgia’s firms have undoubtedly become more 
competitive. For example, the value of Georgian imports and exports has escalated 
considerably over the last two decades – exceeding US$ 600 million and US$200 
million per month, on average, in 2013. However, despite the many positives 
accruing to rising national incomes and increased external trade, and potential 
negatives with regards to a growing trade deficit (reaching a high of 22% of GDP in 
2008 – see Figure 2), what is more concerning are the spatial inequalities that have 
persisted – even tending to increase during periods of economic expansion. The 
presence of large internal differences is, however, by no means a feature unique to 
Georgia. Indeed, it is a feature common to many transition states, ex-Soviet or 
otherwise (Huber 2007). While capital city-regions have tended to benefit most from 
reforms, often becoming absolute political and economic centres in the process, 
peripheral and more sheltered localities have frequently been left to lag behind 
(Tondl and Vuksic 2003; Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper 2011). Similar patterns 
of regional disparities have been observed in numerous other transition contexts, 
including large economies such as China (He, Wei and Xie 2008), as well as in more 
comparable, small, transition states in Eastern Europe such as Slovakia (Banerjee and 
Jarmuzek 2009), Romania (Altomonte and Colantone 2008), and Estonia (Tatar 
2010), as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia (Lessmann 2013). 
Figure 2 here 
                                                     
1
 This is not unambiguously accepted, however. Timm (2013) suggests that these accolades hide a 
multitude of potential negatives, including increasing interference in economic activities, 
infringement upon property rights, and the creation of uncompetitive business contexts, all unlikely 
to aid in economic and social progression within Georgia. 
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Disparities across Georgia’s regions are reflected in a number of its characteristics 
(Table 1). Tbilisi’s regional economy, for example, is home to approximately one 
third of the national population, responsible for half of Georgia’s GDP, and has an 
output level twice the national average (and more than three times that of the most 
lagging regions). Kakheti, by contrast, is much more dependent on primary sectors – 
and is home to over 70% of Georgia’s wine production – which partially accounts for 
its low position in Georgia’s territorial hierarchy. Kvemo Kartli, and to a lesser extent 
Shida Kartli and Mtskheta-Mtianeti, are more industrial, attributable, perhaps, to 
their sharing of a border with the Georgian capital. In general, the most productive 
regions – those that have ascended the national income hierarchy – are those with 
the larger services (Tbilisi and Adjara) and industrial (Kvemo Kartli) sectors. The most 
unproductive are characteristically agrarian economies, or those with a high reliance 
upon the public sector. 
Table 1 here 
Although the described levels of inter-regional disparity are certainly large, albeit 
hardly atypical in such context, it is important to consider why the concentration of 
economic activity in specific regions is necessarily a bad thing, in general, and for 
socialist transition countries like Georgia, in particular? The innovation literature is 
replete with evidence linking spatial concentration with greater levels of innovation 
and, as a result, regional economic growth (Feldman 1994). Simultaneously, the New 
Economic Geography stresses the advantages to agglomeration (Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables 1999), a standpoint once ardently posited by the World Bank – see, for 
example, the 2009 World Development Report (WDR 2009) – where the need to 
promote urban agglomeration was seen as a necessary step to foster economic 
development in aggregate terms – i.e. regional disparities are of little concern in the 
wider context of development and that global integration and trade should be 
pursued in spite of its territorially unbalanced consequences. The problem is, 
however, that irrespective of what the aggregate performance of the national 
economy may suggest, unevenness in the distribution of economic activity will mean 
that some regions and their firms will be left to stagnate. For countries with socialist 
traditions, an enduring orientation towards their domestic markets (and economic 
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structure to suit), limited international links, and the slow adjustment of firms once 
sheltered from the rigours of competition, this transition process is littered with 
frictions that potentially present insurmountable barriers for certain firms to 
compete (Giannias, Liargovas and Chepurko, 2005).  
The key focus of this paper is to analyse how the ability of firms to adapt and thrive 
in a globally competitive trade environment is constrained by the characteristics of 
the region in which they operate. For Georgia, where economic cleavages are 
significant, firms located in the better-connected regions – Tbilisi in particular – are 
likely to benefit from better opportunities to trade, and become more competitive 
as a result, certainly relative to firms located in more remote territories. From this 
viewpoint, unevenness in the distribution of economic activity reflects a classic 
confrontation between the merits of economic efficiency versus (territorial) equity. 
If left unchecked, the tendency for a growing inequality of opportunity between 
regions may result in greater polarisation between stagnating rural regions and more 
vibrant urban cores. In the longer term, not only could these disparities undermine 
the performance of the national economy, but may foment internal social and 
political tensions, become a destabilising force, and ultimately threaten the very 
viability of transition economies as cohesive entities (Anderson and Pomfret 2004). 
This is all the more important where these disparities overlap with the locations of 
different cultural and ethnic groups (Kanbur and Zhang 2005). 
 
Analysing firm competitiveness and regional disparities in Georgia 
A ‘new conventional wisdom’ advances place competitiveness as a central concern 
for regional economic development and policy (Buck et al 2005). The collective 
ability of firms to compete is repeatedly advanced as the foremost determinant for 
explaining the differential economic performance across regions and between 
countries. Increased global trade, by raising the competitive pressures felt by firms, 
demands greater efficiency, and thereby incentivises investments in R&D and new 
technologies . The majority of any given firm’s ability to meet these challenges can 
be explained by its inherent characteristics, as well as by industry-wide 
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characteristics. Nevertheless, location-specific factors may also play an important 
role in firm-level competitiveness. From an empirical standpoint, the first two factors 
– firm- and industry- specific aspects – have received considerable attention, most 
often in terms of export performance, survival, competitiveness, productivity, FDI, 
and innovation (Geroski 1995; Roberts and Tybout 1997; Bernard and Jensen 2004; 
Boermans and Roelfsema, 2015). It is, however, becoming increasingly evident as 
better regional data become available that the characteristics of host regions are 
also highly significant, with a strong bearing upon the development trajectory of 
local firms, which, in turn, feeds back into the aggregate performance of the region 
as a whole (Bristow 2010). It is these factors – the relevant place-based 
characteristics that enable firms to prosper, and consequently shape the evolution of 
regional disparities – that this research casts a spotlight over, as specified in the 
following model:  

ln FIRMCOMPirt  1FIRMCHARirt  2REGCONit i  it  
where 

ln FIRMCOMPirt  is the logarithm of the competitiveness of firm i, in region 
r, at time t. 

FIRMCHARirt  represents a matrix of firm-specific characteristics which 
may affect competitiveness at firm level. 

REGCONit  represents a matrix of place-
specific conditions associated with the region in which each firm operates. 
To conduct our analysis we draw upon the Georgian Industrial Census, the Georgian 
Integrated Household Survey and supplementary data provided by the Georgian 
National Statistics Office (Geostat) to construct an extensive array of firm- and 
regional-level variables. The data are sub-divided into Georgia’s 9 statistical regions 
as employed by Geostat (which excludes Abkhazia)2 and represents annual data 
covering the time period 2006-2012. Due to the often-low quality of data from such 
contexts, we cleaned the dataset in order to remove extreme outliers, particularly 
                                                     
2
 The 9 regions include Tbilisi (1), Adjara (2), Guria (3), Imereti, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti 
(4), Kakheti (5), Shida Kartli and Mtskheta-Mtianeti (6), Samagrelo-Zemo Svaneti (7), Samtskhe-
Javakheti (8) and Kvemo Kartli (9). Data limitations force the noted aggregation of regions 4 and 6, 
consistent with the methodology employed by the Georgian Statistics Office. The Autonomous 
Republic of Abkhazia is excluded from the analysis due to a lack of data. 
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those with significant fluctuations in turnover across years, as well as firms with data 
irregularities, such as negative turnover values or multiple changes in the reported 
sector of activity or region. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel of 13,958 
firms across 43 NACE (revision 1.1) 2-digit sectors, covering both industrial and 
service-based firms. Table 2 provides a correlation matrix of the key variables. 
Table 2 here 
Firm competitiveness 
Measuring firm competitiveness is a challenging undertaking, notwithstanding the 
data limitations frequent in transition contexts. First of all, we interpret 
competitiveness as a poetic way of saying productivity and calculate a simple 
measure of labour productivity as gross valued-added (GVA) per worker. Although 
measures of competitiveness – labour productivity, as utilised, or total factor 
productivity – are far more meaningfully analysed in the manufacturing sector, in 
our analysis we seek to take advantage of our full sample and include service sector 
firms. We, nevertheless, omit firms in the agricultural, mining, and public services 
sector, as is typical in the literature. We employ sector dummies to control for cross-
sectoral variations. As presented in Figure 3, the differences in productivity are 
considerable across regions – even accounting for industrial mix – as is best 
exemplified by the five-fold performance differential between the capital, Tbilisi, and 
Guria, a lagging coastal region. Table 3 provides an indication of these differences 
across firms of different sizes. Although a few large firms are highly productive in 
Georgia it is actually small sized firms that, on average, include some the most 
productive and dynamic firms in Georgia. There are two dimensions to this 
observation. First is that you might expect larger firms to benefit from scale 
economies and lead in terms of productivity. However, the state of bankruptcy 
legislation in Georgia may be a partial explanation for this. Former state owned 
enterprises, many of the largest firms in Georgia, continue to operate in highly 
inefficient states – highly indebted, overstaffed, poor infrastructure, corrupt – and, 
despite major reforms, are yet to be liquidated or significantly restructured (Özsoy 
and Kubetova 2006). Second is the presence of a large shadow economy, which may 
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bias results in territories where barriers to legitimate business are at their most 
pervasive. Nevertheless, the data represent the most comprehensive available, and 
despite these limitations offer the best opportunity to study the firm 
competitiveness landscape in Georgia. 
Figure 3 here 
Table 3 here 
Finally, a note on our choice of labour productivity as our indicator of 
competitiveness. For the most part we opt for this simple measure due to the nature 
of the data and the lack of more sophisticated measurements. However, as a 
robustness test, we also contrast the results of the productivity analysis with a 
number of alternative measures of firm competitiveness, including Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) for a limited sub-set of manufacturing firms using the Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) method,3 a firm’s market share, and profit per worker. These 
alternative measures are omitted from the presented analysis to conserve space as 
they closely corroborate our focal labour productivity findings. 
Firm-level controls 
Firm size (turnover), ownership type (public or private), capital intensity and female 
employment share are included as firm-specific controls. Each helps to explain a 
considerable amount of the observed differences in labour productivity across 
regions. The capital intensity variable is possibly the most indicative. It shows that 
the geography of the average capital intensity of Georgian firms, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, follows a similar pattern to that of productivity. Although the 
assembled variables represent the best available to us, we do acknowledge that 
important additional factors, such as the export-orientation and age of the firm, are 
                                                     
3
 i.e. to overcome the potential bias evident in OLS productivity estimates, we instrument using 
intermediate inputs - materials and energy expenditures. However, insufficient data on various firm 
inputs – including firm investments which precludes computing TFP via the Olley-Pakes method – this 
imposes strong limits on our sample size. We therefore prefer to present the results of the analysis 
using the simpler measure of labour productivity, controlling as best as possible given existing data 
for cross-sectoral variations and capital intensities. 
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notable absentees. Data limitations prevented their inclusion and our results should 
be interpreted accordingly. 
The role of territory 
The economic geography literature has forged strong linkages between geographical 
space and the performance of regions and firms, largely in terms of attributes such 
as export performance, competitiveness and innovation. In addition, the 2009 World 
Development Report emphasizes the range of structural, place-specific and ‘softer’ 
government and institutional factors that are instrumental in shaping the evolution 
of disparities between regions. The qualities of specific places, such as the 
particularized benefits of agglomeration and the amassing of a critical mass of skilled 
workers and knowledge-intensive activities are well studied, featuring heavily in 
contemporary research on firm competitiveness (Malmberg et al 2000). Less 
common, however, is analysis of the range of regional attributes that potentially 
influence the competitiveness of firms. Our aim is to uncover some of the key 
location-specific attributes that affect firm competitiveness, which we broadly 
decompose into two categories, pure location factors (so-called first-nature 
geography) and second-nature geography. 
First-nature geography 
The literature concerning the geography of globalization recognizes that natural, 
physical advantages, including the natural environment, shape proximity between 
economic agents and the evolution of regions as productive spaces (Ellison and 
Glaeser 1999; Beeson et al 2001). The variety of different first-nature features, such 
as climactic conditions, ease of access – often linked to a regions proximity to the 
coast and waterways and physical barriers such as mountain ranges – as well as 
other natural resource endowments, mean that it is more or less self-evident that 
the type and prevalence of economic activities pursued will vary across space 
(Ottaviano and Thisse 2004). Some factors raise the transport costs associated with 
conducting trade [such as being landlocked or obstructed by a mountain range 
(Rappaport and Sachs 2003)], which may affect the competitiveness of firms 
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sensitive to these disadvantages (Ghemawat 2007) and inhibit access to distant 
domestic and international markets. 
We employ two indicators to measure the significance of pure geographical 
advantages for each region. The first, ‘ruggedness’, represents a measure of 
topographic variation, generated by calculating the coefficient of variation of 
elevation across each region. Georgia is not only a very mountainous country, with 
several ranges of the Caucasus that carve its territory, including the Likhi Range 
which divides the country into an eastern and a western half. This variable, 
therefore, is used to proxy for a region’s accessibility to inter-regional, as well as 
international, trade through its influence on transportation costs and travel time. In 
addition, a measure of regional climactic variability is employed to proxy for 
advantages in terms of agricultural potential. After trialling several variations 
pertaining to average temperatures, sun-shine hours and rainfall, each producing 
similar results, we settled upon average July rainfall for the presented analysis. The 
variables indicate that Georgia’s climate varies considerably, across different 
elevations and in line with a regions proximity to the Black Sea. We also considered 
additional variables, such as the proximity to Georgia’s short coastline and border 
effects associated with Georgia’s neighbouring countries, using dummy variables. 
Both are omitted from the presented analysis, The former because it correlates 
highly with the aforementioned climactic variable, while the latter in the interest of a 
parsimonious baseline model. In any case, their inclusion neither proved significant 
nor altered the sign and significance of the main results. 
Second-nature geography 
First-nature features, whilst still relevant, potentially play an increasingly 
subordinate role to the geography of interaction between economic agents. An 
extensive literature documents the importance of agglomeration economies and 
dense networks of interaction between economic agents as fundamental drivers of 
firm competitiveness and regional growth (Marshall 1890; Fujita and Thisse 2002; 
Duranton and Puga 2004). Generally, densely populated areas are associated with 
higher productivity and innovation, driven by a greater probability of interaction 
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between proximate firms and individuals (Glaeser et al 1992; Ciccone 2002). This is 
particularly beneficial for the exchange of ideas and the diffusion of new 
technologies, benefitting firms that are highly sensitive to, and reliant upon, the 
external environment for knowledge acquisition (Duranton and Puga 2001). We 
include a population density variable to indicate the potential for efficiency gains 
and knowledge spillovers due to the increased probability for more frequent 
interactions between proximate individuals and within dense urban areas 
(Malmberg et al 2000). However, excessive density can also impose costs on the 
regional environment by creating transactions costs in terms of transport network 
congestion and place strain on shared resources, such as power outages (Krugman 
1991). 
Two more specific conceptions of externality are associated with the industrial 
composition of a particular place, and are constituted by what are known as 
‘localization’ and ‘urbanization’ economies. The notion of localization refers to the 
positive externalities derived from the concentration of similar activities in space, 
such as co-located firms engaged in similar activities. We measure the extent of 
localization as the level of own-industry regional specialization for each firm (i.e. the 
total employment in firms in sector j in region i as a % of total employment in sector 
j). This is a relative measure that weights each of these shares by the national 
average for each sector. In general, localisation economies refer to static, co-
ordination and network benefits between firms that share similar knowledge bases 
(Henderson 1988), and dynamic externalities related to knowledge spillovers, 
increased competitive pressures, and the deepening of knowledge resources and 
skills in the locality. Greater levels of specialization further benefit the performance 
of firms by enhancing the matching between large local pools of skilled workers 
(Glaeser and Maré 2001). As a region’s specialised profile evolves, institutional 
externalities may also enhance the local business environment for that particular 
sector. Formal institutions, such as public services, may become more efficient in 
supporting and serving the needs of specialized firms. The co-evolution of informal 
institutions, including new social conventions and networks, may facilitate 
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knowledge spillovers and lower transactions costs, creating virtuous circles that raise 
the competitiveness of local firms. 
Urbanization economies, by contrast, pertain to the benefits derived from a dense 
and diverse industrial structure. Where localization is assumed to deepen knowledge 
bases, providing benefits to firms in closely related sectors, urbanization broadens 
the local knowledge stock and provides a richer knowledge mix. This provides a basis 
for more diverse interactions and increases the potential for radical innovations 
across less-related sectors (Jacobs 1969). To capture the extent of potential 
urbanization we use a Herfindahl-based measure of industrial diversity, calculated as 
follows: 

DIVrt 1 srst
2
i

 
where 

rst
2
s  emprst emprt  
Where industrial diversity (

DIVrt) is equal to one minus the sum of the squared 
employment shares in each region (

r ) for each sector (

s) in each year (

t ). The 
diversity index measures the sectoral mix of the entire regional economy and 
achieves a minimum value of 0 when total regional employment in concentrated in a 
single sector and increases with higher levels of economic diversity. Although 
relatively high levels of diversity are evident throughout Georgia, the highest levels 
are present in the Kvemo Kartli and Imereti, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti 
regions. For Kvemo Kartli in particular, this result may suggest the importance of its 
proximity to Tbilisi, becoming a destination for firms, such as large manufacturing 
plants, to relocate to avoid the high costs and congestion in Tbilisi, whilst 
maintaining access to the largest market within Georgia. 
Other regional attributes, some linked to agglomeration, are of fundamental 
importance to the competitiveness of firms within a given regional context, yet 
receive much less attention in the literature. Factors related to the local labour 
market, the business environment and general investment climate, as well as softer, 
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socio-economic features, such as the institutional setting and the government policy 
sphere, may also influence the ability of firms to trade, grow and compete. 
Labour market 
The quantity of qualified labour, the unemployment rate and the level of income 
with each region are likely to have significant implications for the competitiveness of 
firms (Scott 1988; Backman 2013). We construct indicators for the proportion of the 
economically active population with post-secondary and higher education, to 
represent the quantity of skilled human capital available to firms, the unemployment 
rate using the ‘strict’ ILO criteria, and the median household income in each region. 
Each indicator reveals distinctly different geographical patterns. Although Tbilisi is 
clearly a key centre of skilled employment and high incomes, the proportion of 
highly educated inhabitants is the country’s lowest and the unemployment rate is 
more than double that of the other regions in Georgia (see Figure 4B). Focusing on 
incomes alone, the data reveal a distinctive East-West divide, which – with the 
marked exception of Tbilisi – favours the regions in closer proximity to Georgia’s 
Western coastline and to Russia. This is an indication of the potential advantages of 
a coastal and more accessible location on the Black Sea for tourism, trade, and 
transportation. These differences in regional patterns, particularly with respect to 
incomes, unemployment and average labour productivity levels, suggest that 
differences in regional labour market conditions, such as variations in labour 
demand and impediments to the flows of labour and capital, shape the variation we 
see in the ranking of regions, as well as the level of regional disparities. 
Business and investment climate 
A sound business environment and investment climate are critical to 
competitiveness. We assess a number of relevant features. First, we analyse if many 
entrepreneurs and small firms – proxied as the proportion of regional employment 
in SMEs (fewer than 250 employees) – may be reflective of a region that is both 
dynamic and adaptable (Chinitz 1961; Glaeser and Kerr 2009) - smaller firms tend to 
play a bigger role in poorer, less productive regions. Large knowledge intensive (KIS) 
and/or high technology (HTM) sectors may foster knowledge spillovers and learning 
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externalities that benefit the regional system as a whole,  measured the proportion 
of employment in local firms categorized as active in KIS and HTM sectors.4 Mapped 
in Figure 4C, it is interesting to note that although Tbilisi suffers from a proportional 
disadvantage in terms highly educated workers, the absolute size of its skilled labour 
pool, among other things, means that the capital is able to be dominant in terms of 
active KIS and HTM firms. Finally, we assess the significance of the investment 
climate by analysing the level of per capita private sector investment in each region. 
Figure 4D shows us that Tbilisi is the private investment capital, but also that 
proximity to the capital drives investment to nearby regions, such as Kvemo Kartli.  
Social factors 
The presence of significant minority population groups and high incidences of 
poverty may have significant effects on the productivity of individuals and firms. 
Minority groups may be socially, economically or politically marginalised, and face 
greater barriers with respect to labour market access and in the acquisition of skills. 
In Georgia, significant minority groups are located in the South and Western regions, 
those bordering Azerbaijan and Armenia, and particularly the regions of Samtskhe-
Javakheti (51% of Armenian nationality) and Kvemo Kartli (53% of Azerbaijani 
nationality). The incidence of poverty, measured in terms of the proportion of the 
population below 60% of median consumption, exhibits a relatively strong Eastern 
bias, with the exception of Tbilisi and Guria, reaching up to 36% of the population in 
the Kakheti region (Figure 4E).. 
Decentralisation and local expenditures 
With an ambitious strategy for decentralisation and the strengthening of 
government at the regional level on the immediate horizon (State Strategy for 
Regional Development 2010–2017), we analyse a range of governmental 
expenditure variables to assess the extent to which current financial structures serve 
                                                     
4
 KIS and HTM sectors include: KIS (NACE codes 64, 72, 73) and HTM (NACE codes: 24.4, 30, 32, 33) 
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to exacerbate or reduce regional disparities in firm competitiveness. The aims of 
these reforms include moves to strengthen democracy, increase transparency, and 
boost efficiency in the delivery of public goods, as well as to invoke greater 
participation by the Georgian population in decision-making. We do caution 
however, that the annual expenditure data available are highly aggregated, making it 
difficult to assess the impact of specific public investments focused on, for example, 
developing infrastructure. 
The leading regions of Georgia tend to enjoy the highest levels of per capita public 
spending (see Figure 4F). We observe considerable differences in per capita 
expenditures across regions, with four- and five-fold inter-regional disparities in per 
capita terms between the highest funded (Adjara and Tbilisi) and lowest funded 
(Kakheti) regions. In addition, the regional patterns differ according to the core 
component of regional public expenditure, which we are able to group into 
subsidies, social benefits, transport, and education. Where per capita transportation 
expenditures (Figure 4G) are particularly high in Tbilisi and Georgia’s leading 
Western regions – Adjara in particular – education and social expenditures appear to 
be more evenly distributed, with some intermediate and lagging regions ranking 
highly. Social expenditures, in particular, are higher in the most lagging regions, 
perhaps where you would expect to find the most need. However, the overall 
balance tends to place upward pressure of existing disparities, with Tbilisi 
consistently outspending all other regions in per capita terms. 
Spatial spillovers 
An additional theme often stressed in the economic geography literature is the role 
of spatial interactions and spillovers between regions, which may create mutually 
reinforcing external effects (Ottaviano and Thisse 2005) and mean that the 
competitive environment faced by firms is influenced by not only by its regional 
endowments, but potentially by the cumulative endowments of the regional system 
as a whole. For a country like Georgia, with a dominant urban core, regions in closer 
proximity to this leading node may benefit from important inter-regional 
externalities and spillovers. Moreover, regions along Georgia’s Black Sea coastline 
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may benefit from lower transactions costs to trade and exporting. We incorporate 
and test for the presence of,these potential spatial spillover effects by taking the 
spatial lag of each variable to assess the impact of inter-regional interactions and 
spillovers on local firms. This complements our examination of the specific 
characteristics of the host region on firm competitiveness with an examination of 
the influence of the same characteristic in neighbouring regions that may flow across 
intra-national borders. We apply a spatial weights structure of first order contiguity, 
which, due to the topographic, linguistic, cultural and institutional differences 
between Georgian regions, likely represents the extent of spatial interactions across 
regions, and may in some cases even preclude them, becoming region and country-
level constraints (Branstetter 2001).  
Additional methodological remarks 
To give a sense of the relative magnitude of the determinants of firm performance 
we first specify a multilevel model that structures the data in such a way that we can 
gain some insights into the drivers of labour productivity in Georgian firms by 
calculating variance partition coefficients at different levels (i.e. factors at the level 
of the firm, industry and region; see Table 4). In model 1, we find that approximately 
8% of the variation in firms performance in attributable to region-level 
characteristics. Model 2 suggests that approximately 11% of this variability is 
ascribed to sector-level factors. When structured with both region-level and sector-
level components, the multi-level analysis indicates that 5% of the variability in firm 
labour productivity is attributable to region-level factors, 13% to sector-specific 
factors and the remainder, 82%, a function of firm-level differences. Thus, although 
the region plays a slightly subsidiary role in terms of its association with firm 
performance, it is nevertheless an important factor that deserves close scrutiny. If 
Georgia is to continue to grow and become a bigger player in global trade it is 
necessary to maximise the performance of firms in all available areas. 
Table 4 here 
For the remainder of our analysis we structure a panel data model, as opposed to 
the multi-level model, which does not perform well in our more detailed analysis. 
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We therefore proceed using a panel data model and employ and compare fixed- and 
random-effects specifications. While the former absorbs time-invariant factors 
specific to each firm, such as the entrepreneurial talents of the owners, and also the 
self-selection of clustered firms which we are unable to measure directly, the latter 
is necessary in order to model the impact of time-invariant factors, such as the 
impact of first-nature geographical features. Region and sector dummies (4 digit 
NACE) are included to control for time-invariant features related to the place and 
industrial activity. Importantly, as our data spans the 2008 crises years, both 
estimation methods incorporate year-dummies to control for macroeconomic 
shocks, along with the use of robust standard errors, clustered at the region–sector 
level. We present the generalized version of the Hausman statistic, the Sargan-
Hansen test, in order to assess the preferred specification in each instance. 
Finally, due to a high incidence of multicollinearity between regional-level variables 
(as seen earlier in Table 2) we run a series of cascading regressions. This modelling 
strategy first sets out a basic model, which includes all available firm-specific 
characteristics and a set of core regional variables chosen to represent the physical, 
first-nature geography, and agglomeration factors – this forms the baseline model. 
Subsequently, we then examine several thematic sets of regional factors for their 
association with firm competitiveness. Coefficients are interpreted as conditional 
correlations. 
 
Empirical results 
Baseline model 
Larger firms, higher capital intensities and private sector-ownership all prove to be 
significant and positively associated with our measures of firm competitiveness 
(Table 5). Female participation rates attain a negative coefficient. We suggest this 
reflects the relative differences in gender composition between manufacturing and 
service sector firms, where productivity tends to be higher in the former, and also 
within sectors, such as a potential sectoral bias in manufacturing, where female 
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participation tends to be highest in more labour intensive activities (e.g. apparel). 
These firm-level effects remain qualitatively unchanged throughout the remaining 
regressions.  
Table 5 here 
In regressions 3 and 4, we introduce the agglomeration indicators, namely 
localisation, urbanisation, and density. Localisation economies are indicated to be 
important for firm competitiveness in our random effects models. Firms active in 
regions with existing clusters of firms and employment in the same industry benefit 
from a skilled, specialized local labour pool, and may well benefit from knowledge 
spillovers from competitor firms, and from a combination of intra-sectoral 
cooperation and competitive rivalry. The urbanisation or diversity variable achieves a 
positive sign, consistent with the Jacobian externality thesis that indicates the 
potential benefits from local inter-sector spillovers that may be important for more 
radical forms of innovation and productivity enhancing ideas across sectors, but is 
statistically insignificant. On balance, the results suggest that the benefits of 
localised specialization are of greater importance to Georgian firms. Surprisingly, 
density is negatively associated with labour productivity, but is statistically 
insignificant. This result may be a consequence of strong linkages between each of 
our measures of agglomeration, which may be difficult to disentangle empirically. 
Indeed, if included individually, each attains a positive sign and significance. 
Regressions 5 and 6 complete the baseline specification with the inclusion of spatial 
spillovers for the region-level variables. Both the regional average values of 
industrial diversity and density are negatively associated with labour productivity, 
however only the spatially weighted diversity indicator attains significance in the 
random effects specification. This suggests that the drawbacks to locating in regions 
neighbouring large agglomerations outweighs the benefits of any potential spatial 
spillovers. In a small country like Georgia, it appears that a firm’s competitiveness, 
and likely the performance of the regional economy, benefit from large and dynamic 
regional economies supported by agglomeration – and principally localization – 
economies. 
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The final two columns of the table include the two first-nature geography variables. 
Regions with a more rugged topography face greater challenges associated with 
sustaining dense built environments, central to fully benefit from agglomeration 
economies, and bear increased transport costs, which are likely be detrimental to 
trade and firm competitiveness. High ruggedness values, particularly associated with 
high elevations among the various ranges of the Caucus Mountains, divide the 
Georgian regional landscape and create natural barriers that shape the main trade 
routes and thoroughfares. As anticipated, this factor is negatively associated with 
competitiveness of firms, however this result is statistically insignificant. The 
alternative control, average July rainfall, is employed as a measure of climactic 
conditions, which varies considerably in Georgia, and is also negatively associated 
with firm competitiveness, albeit insignificantly. Together this suggests that although 
first-nature geographical factors likely played an important part in the structure of 
the Georgian economy, the competitiveness of modern Georgian firms is most likely 
to be associated with a range of second-nature geographic factors. As Georgia 
continues to modernise and raise competitiveness, this is only likely to continue.  
Table 6 here 
Labour market variables 
Regions with higher shares of highly educated workers provide a boost to the 
competitiveness of local firms. Proximity to regions with higher endowments of 
skilled workers, however, does not appear beneficial, suggesting there is no 
possibility of regions free-riding on the human resources of their neighbours. This 
implies that the absence of a local, skilled population is a fundamental handicap for 
the performance of local firms, which cannot be easily compensated by, for example, 
attracting skilled commuters from nearby regions. Alternative research has also 
highlighted that, although more Georgian’s have attained higher education in recent 
years, skills poorly align with the demands of local industry, hindering 
competitiveness (Kuriakose, 2013). Further, high-income regions appear to be where 
Georgia’s most competitive firms are to be found. Neighbouring wealthy regions, 
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however, are found to be detrimental to competitiveness. Income disparities likely 
motivate Georgia’s highest skilled to migrate for better, higher paid opportunities.  
Higher rates of unemployment are negatively associated with firm performance, 
albeit insignificantly. Spatial spillover effects, however, are detrimental for the 
labour productivity of firms. A possible explanation for this result is influence of the 
capital, Tbilisi. In spite of Tbilisi’s prominence as the national centre of business and 
employment, it has the highest rates of unemployment by some considerable 
margin. Following the end of the economic boom period in 2007, substantial 
downsizing in the public sector was not fully absorbed by the private sector, adding 
greatly to unemployment. Rural-urban migration has also exacerbated this trend. In 
addition, the city is still likely to be a major draw for the most highly skilled workers, 
denting the productivity of firms in neighbouring regions. However, some caution 
should be exercised when interpreting the unemployment data. Due to the way in 
which the Georgian statistics office records instances of self-sufficient farming as 
self-employment,5 potentially producing low estimates for unemployment in largely 
rural regions. For example, Guria, Georgia’s least productive region, has some of the 
lowest unemployment rates, which may not be a true reflection of the employment 
situation as many of the `employed’ are likely absorbed in subsistence agriculture or 
related temporary, self-sufficient, or informal work, but recorded as employed. 
Social factors 
Broadly, we find a consistent negative association between social disparities and 
firm competitiveness, with factors such as the large ethnic minority populations 
(generally along the Southern border of Georgia) and high incidences of poverty all 
associated with low labour productivity. These findings likely do not reflect 
drawbacks associated with social issues directly, certainly in any causal respect, but 
rather hint towards a lack of other resources and endowments, such as 
agglomeration economies and good institutions. Ethnic and cultural tensions, and 
                                                     
5
 For example, heads of households engaged in (often subsistence) agriculture are recorded as 
‘individual entrepreneurs’, and family members as ‘unpaid family business workers’. 
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the marginalisation of particular ethnic groups, including clashes between de facto 
independent states within Georgia are, however, likely to be critical for an affected 
region’s economic performance and development. 
Business and investment climate 
Concentrations of knowledge intensive (KIS) firms do not seem to influence the 
labour productivity of Georgian firms. Whilst clusters of knowledge-intensive firms 
form the backbone of innovative places globally, suggesting that policies able to 
identify and support emerging clusters may be a major factor to foster development 
and raise productivity, Georgian regions may be lacking in other areas necessary for 
these effects to be realised. For example, as a World Bank report into private sector 
development in Georgia states, not only “R&D is limited, even among high-growth 
firms […] there is virtually no industry-research collaboration” (Kuriakose, 2013, 
p.60) and  “despite various education reforms, a skills gap remains between the skills 
of Georgia’s labor force and the needs of the enterprise sector” (ibid, p.58). 
The share of employment in SMEs - generally used as a proxy for vibrant, 
competitive and entrepreneurial business environments - is negatively associated 
with firm performance. However, as manufacturing firms comprise a significant 
proportion of the firms in the dataset, it may simply be the case that size matters 
most for labour productivity – as one would expect to be the case – and that 
economies of scale predominate. Moreover, as noted by Christie (2008), the 
presence of a large shadow economy and the relative scarcity of new and emerging 
medium and large firms (the restructuring of existing large firms is a separate issue) 
may contribute to the continuing presence of an excess of relatively inefficient SMEs. 
Many of these SMEs would otherwise have “disappeared or been forced to improve” 
in its absence (p. 21)”. As such, as SMEs tend to be at their most prevalent in 
Georgia’s less productive regions,  these sorts of barriers to growth – also typically 
linked with corruption – are likely to represent glass ceilings to firms becoming large. 
Although we would have expected to find regional levels of private investment as 
clear assets for a firm’s competitiveness, our results prove inconclusive. In this 
respect is most likely that firm-level investments are the key driver of performance, 
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linked to greater levels of capital intensity, and that firms are unable to benefit from 
the investments of others. Considerable investments in restructuring, as well as the 
noted inefficiencies in large unreformed firms, may also be major factors driving this 
finding. Many of Georgia’ s largest firms – those with the greatest capacity to invest 
in infrastructure, new technologies, and other capacity/productivity enhancing areas 
– are in need of substantial restructuring, and are a major concern for future 
competitiveness. Large, productive firms will be needed to drive Georgia into a more 
internationally competitive state. To create the best conditions for these firms to 
thrive inefficient institutions need to be overhauled, terminal and unproductive 
firms liquidated, and truly productive firms instated in their place to engender 
growth and foster social and economic development.  
Decentralisation and regional budget expenditures 
Total regional expenses per capita are strongly associated with firm competitiveness. 
When we analyse the components of this spending, we find a range of factors that 
are correlated with our competitiveness measures. Core components including 
transportation expenditure, subsidies, and social protection spending, are all 
positively and significantly associated with firm performance. On subsidies 
specifically, this may suggest that governmental structures of support and incentives 
in place for firms may yield some productive benefits. However, lacking detailed 
information on the nature of subsidies spending within regions, we are unable to 
test this claim. In contrast to the above, we fail to find a positive link between 
education spending and firm performance, however, as the costs of education are 
likely to vary widely per head, for instance remote regions are likely to receive higher 
spending per head that schools in large agglomerations, this should be interpreted 
with caution. Moreover, as illustrated by Chankseliani (2013), rural disadvantage in 
education is a concern – 81% of university students are from urban areas, which 
constitute just over half the population – with an even wider urban-rural divide in 
the most prestigious higher education institutions in the country. In the long term 
this can only serve to curb the aspirations of the rural youth and to further 
exacerbate backwardness and regional cleavages for rural areas. Finally, spatial 
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spillovers appear negligible in the majority of cases, again suggesting there is no 
possibility of free riding on neighbouring resources. 
Collectively, the results tend to stress that current major components of regional 
public expenditure serve to sustain, and even enlarge, existing disparities between 
regions. Although some of the regional discrepancies may simply reflect differences 
in costs, related to physical geography and inherited infrastructure and facilities, 
differences may also point toward bias in bargaining practices for finance and the 
types of allocation mechanisms in place. If these mechanisms are just historical 
artefacts, and do not adequately reflect the current needs and realities of the 
regions, the prevailing system may simply perpetuate territorial imbalances. In all, 
the results tend to suggest that the current decentralisation programme needs to 
confront a range of real regional concerns if it is to create a more enabling 
environment for firm to compete and trade domestically and internationally. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Georgia’s recent economic growth performance and increasing participation in 
international trade highlights the significant potential to further modernize and 
become an internationally competitive economy, with firms equipped to meet these 
competitiveness challenges. The country has many assets, including a well-educated 
workforce and strong export industries – in areas such as viticulture/winemaking, 
and mineral extraction, among others, features you would expect to see within a 
country at a significantly higher stage of development (Jackson 2004). However, in 
spite of its progress, Georgia remains one of the lowest income countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. Persistent territorial disparities, high levels of poverty, a 
high incidence of rural subsistence agriculture, and urban unemployment highlight 
the underlying economic, social, and political challenges that threaten to stall the 
future development of Georgian regions (Japaridze 2010; World Bank 2013). 
Significant reforms that address the needs of all regions are necessary if Georgian 
firms are to modernize and compete more widely, and also for Georgia to begin to 
reduce the trade deficit that is being accumulated.  
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In light of the analysis, there is considerable likelihood that Georgia’s growing trade 
openness has affected firms located in different regions in different ways. Although a 
considerable proportion of an individual firm’s competitiveness is associated with 
sorting and compositional effects – related to its own specific characteristics – 
important place-specific effects are also highly relevant. The analysis highlights that 
local conditions, such as local expenditures, transport infrastructure, and human 
capital endowments in particular, affect the competitiveness of Georgian firms. 
Thus, given the current endowments across regions, significant attention will be 
needed to building capacities in less-favoured areas, if global trade is not to further 
harm firms located in less well-off regions of Georgia. By targeting gaps in 
infrastructure provision, and helping marginalized regions to access larger domestic 
and international markets, firms can begin to raise their standards and benefit from 
scale economies and lower transactions costs, raising their capacity to rise to global 
challenges. Our analysis also highlights that job creation, better alignment between 
education and the local needs of enterprises, and support for small firms should be a 
priority, particularly in areas where unemployment is high. These findings combine 
well with existing research into entrepreneurship and innovation in Georgia 
(Kuriakose, 2013). Although, currently, small and medium sized firms are some of 
the most productive in the country, they may also be those that are most sensitive 
to their external environments for knowledge spillovers and trade opportunities – 
especially in light of the rather limited (if any) investments such firms make in R&D 
(in contrast to regional peers, like Armenia). The positive externalities associated 
with this process can then help to lift the performance of the region and help to 
minimise socio-economic imbalances across territories. Even where these factors 
show only weak significance in our findings today, for the future of Georgia’s 
development these factors are only likely to become more necessary as the country 
transitions to more advanced activities, higher in global production chains. For now, 
however, interventions need to me mindful of the potential downsides to greater 
integration. If firms that currently thrive in relatively sheltered regions are unable to 
compete once barriers to trade – poor levels of infrastructure, for example – are 
removed, the effect may be to further widen disparities and become a pervasive 
source of socio-economic and political instability. Complementary capacities need to 
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be developed in tandem with, or prior to, greater integration, with investments in 
education and training, raising levels of human capital, likely to prove important 
areas to focus on.  
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Figure 1:  Evolution of national output across selected transition states 
Source: World development indicators; Authors’ calculations 
Note: Regional averages include the following states: Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan); Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan); Eastern Europe (Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova). 
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Figure 2: Annual imports, exports, and trade deficit (million USD) 
Source: Geostat; Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 3: Regional disparities in Georgia 
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Tables 
Table 1: Dispersion in regional output (national average = 100)  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
TB 187.14 191.39 184.59 180.46 181.04 181.73 190.77 
SJ 71.53 76.74 85.37 87.40 87.77 88.47 85.05 
GU 88.38 82.84 73.38 76.45 75.75 75.44 74.95 
IM_RK 62.81 67.32 72.66 76.79 73.26 72.32 70.47 
KK 64.43 62.99 62.24 61.14 66.05 67.34 62.98 
SZ 81.77 76.59 62.29 62.69 67.01 66.46 61.88 
AD 71.19 67.05 67.22 73.28 70.59 67.42 61.63 
KA 74.47 65.64 67.23 64.69 65.57 66.58 60.29 
SK_MM 63.89 58.82 64.76 58.57 59.26 60.31 57.01 
 convergence 0.339 0.355 0.342 0.344 0.334 0.335 0.374 
Note: Ranked by 2012 GDP index values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix (regional variables) 
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Localisation 1.00 
                  Urbanisation 0.00 1.00 
                 Topography -0.73 0.14 1.00 
                Rainfull (July) -0.55 0.06 0.71 1.00 
               Density 0.92 -0.17 -0.79 -0.60 1.00 
              Human capital 0.35 -0.06 -0.30 -0.22 0.39 1.00 
             Unemployment 0.86 -0.19 -0.78 -0.43 0.93 0.41 1.00 
            Income 0.82 -0.17 -0.70 -0.54 0.88 0.29 0.78 1.00 
           Minority pop. 0.14 0.04 -0.48 -0.31 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.15 1.00 
          Poverty -0.71 0.14 0.59 0.49 -0.76 -0.36 -0.65 -0.87 -0.11 1.00 
         Pension recipients 0.81 -0.18 -0.80 -0.50 0.86 0.19 0.85 0.86 0.20 -0.71 1.00 
        SME employment -0.77 0.20 0.65 0.27 -0.82 -0.34 -0.89 -0.75 0.17 0.64 -0.79 1.00 
       KIS & HTM empl. 0.87 -0.16 -0.75 -0.49 0.95 0.51 0.96 0.74 0.13 -0.62 0.77 -0.81 1.00 
      Private investment 0.88 -0.16 -0.75 -0.57 0.95 0.20 0.87 0.91 0.16 -0.75 0.86 -0.79 0.85 1.00 
     Public expenditure 0.75 -0.18 -0.67 -0.24 0.81 0.13 0.86 0.70 0.10 -0.44 0.73 -0.81 0.85 0.74 1.00 
    Subsidies -0.14 -0.07 0.25 0.65 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.27 0.20 -0.20 -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.31 1.00 
   Social benefits 0.87 -0.17 -0.75 -0.54 0.94 -0.03 0.91 0.91 0.19 -0.68 0.85 -0.81 0.91 0.95 0.83 -0.04 1.00 
  Education 0.46 -0.14 -0.37 0.04 0.49 0.33 0.63 0.42 -0.02 -0.24 0.53 -0.58 0.59 0.44 0.77 0.17 0.66 1.00 
 Transport 0.55 -0.12 -0.47 -0.31 0.59 0.35 0.55 0.70 0.13 -0.47 0.65 -0.52 0.54 0.55 0.67 -0.18 0.73 0.67 1.00 
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Table 3: Labour productivity in 2012 (GVA per worker in GEL)  
 
All Sizes Micro Small Medium Large 
TB 20,291 20,100 22,257 16,505 19,205 
 
21,507 12,591 6,051 2,372 493 
AD 10,058 9,659 11,209 10,374 12,097 
 
4,796 3,431 967 329 69 
SZ 8,175 6,588 11,693 12,801 15,512 
 
3,106 2,220 636 219 31 
KK 7,618 5,908 11,246 18,391 23,228 
 
3,418 2,621 580 204 13 
SK_MM 6,745 5,616 8,153 12,834 16,117 
 2,879 2,108 519 227 25 
KA 6,114 5,190 8,318 13,358 10,076 
 
2,198 1,749 319 118 12 
SJ 5,958 5,017 8,121 11,782 - 
 
1,402 1,070 254 78 - 
IM_RK 5,177 4,404 7,269 10,823 4,759 
 
5,335 4,176 886 245 28 
GU 3,305 3,000 4,163 5,977 - 
 
1,169 939 180 50 - 
ALL FIRMS 13,268 11,721 16,917 14,961 17,500 
  45,810 30,905 10,392 3,842 671 
Note: Number of firms observed in italics. Firm sizes bands defined as follows: Micro (<10 
employees), Small (10–49 employees), Medium (51-250) and Large (>250); - signifies insufficient data 
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Table 4: Multi level analysis of labour productivity heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 7.943*** 8.379*** 7.977*** 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) 
Variance    
Firm 1.862 1.859 1.638 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Region 0.157  0.093 
 (0.07)  (0.05) 
Sector  0.232 0.259 
  (0.06) (0.03) 
Variance partition 
coefficient 
   
Firm 92.2% 88.9% 82.3% 
Region 7.8%  4.7% 
Sector  11.1% 13.0% 
`No. 13,958 13,958 13,958 
Log likelihood -24163.9 -24187.1 -23449.5 
LR Test 1887.7*** 1841.2*** 3316.5*** 
Groups 9 43  
Min firms 332 2  
Max firms 6,751 2,377  
Average firms 1,550.9 424.6  
 
 
 
 
  
 41 
 
Table 5: Baseline specification (Labour productivity) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size (turnover) 0.543*** 0.449*** 0.543*** 0.448*** 0.543*** 0.448*** 0.448*** 0.448*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital intensity 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female workers -0.058 -0.260*** -0.057 -0.258*** -0.057 -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.258*** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ownership 0.136 0.511*** 0.134 0.502*** 0.133 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Localisation   0.054 0.106*** 0.053 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
   (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Urbanisation   0.090 0.041 -0.025 -0.140 -0.140 -0.140 
   (0.52) (0.32) (0.54) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Density   -1.009 -0.333 -1.007 -0.347 -0.347 -0.347 
   (0.93) (0.54) (0.93) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Wx*diversity     -0.600 -0.947* -0.947* -0.947* 
     (0.87) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
Wx*denisty     -0.108 -0.295 -0.295 -0.295 
     (1.52) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Topography       -0.823  
       (1.24)  
Rainfall (July)        -0.505 
        (1.99) 
FE/RE FE RE FE RE FE RE RE RE 
Region dummies  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
Sector dummies  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. 28,507 28,507 28,507 28,507 28,507 28,507 28507 28507 
R
2
 adjusted 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 
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Sargan-Hansen test   182.48***  201.98***  202.08***   
p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Cascading regressions (coefficients only) 
Human capital 0.183*** 0.155*** KIS & HTM share 0.015 0.006 
 (0.05) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) 
Wx*human capital -0.442 -0.323 
Wx* KIS & HTM 
share 
0.005 0.018 
 (0.46) (0.27)  (0.07) (0.05) 
Unemployment -0.065 -0.083 Private investment 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.11) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.02) 
Wx*unemployment -0.426*** -0.394*** 
Wx*private 
investment 
-0.070 -0.081** 
 (0.14) (0.09)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Income 0.275 0.266** Expenditure 0.238** 0.205*** 
 (0.19) (0.13)  (0.10) (0.05) 
Wx*income -0.015 -0.157 Wx*expenditure -0.286 -0.140 
 (0.32) (0.22)  (0.24) (0.14) 
Minorities -0.048 -0.053* Subsidies 0.207 0.199*** 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.13) (0.07) 
Wx* minorities -0.071 -0.097 Wx*subsidies -0.039 -0.021 
 (0.12) (0.08)  (0.17) (0.10) 
Poverty -0.065 -0.059 Social benefits 0.099 0.103** 
 (0.11) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.04) 
Wx*poverty -0.420* -0.272 Wx*social benefits -0.007 0.030 
 (0.25) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.09) 
Pension recipients -0.274** -0.285*** Education -0.026 -0.048* 
 (0.14) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.02) 
Wx*pension 
recipients 
-0.277 -0.348** Wx*education 
0.054 0.041 
 (0.23) (0.14)  (0.07) (0.04) 
SME share -0.079 -0.054 Transport 0.027 0.034*** 
 (0.14) (0.10)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Wx*SME share 0.089 0.179 Wx*transport 0.007 0.012 
 (0.36) (0.25)  (0.04) (0.03) 
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FE/RE FE RE FE/RE FE RE 
Region dummies  Y Region dummies  Y 
Sector dummies  Y Sector dummies  Y 
Time dummies Y Y Time dummies Y Y 
No. 28,507 28,507 No. 28,507 28,507 
p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
